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BOOKS
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW. By John Hart Ely. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1980. Pp. 268. $15.00.
Reviewed by GerardE. Lynch

*

John Hart Ely's Democracy and Distrust is an ambitious attempt to
create a new theory of judicial review, breaking away from both "interpretivism" and "noninterpretivism"-a division Professor Ely regards as a
"false dichotomy" (p. vii). The book is brilliant and provocative, so much
so that one fears less that its faults will be obscured-there is little danger
that polemic critics will fail to pounce on them-than that the flash of Professor Ely's reasoning and the controversy it generates will distract us from
the genuine importance of the insight that powers his analysis.
I
Professor Ely wants to reject both sides of what most writers have seen
as the fundamental division between theories of judicial review that are
interpretivist and ones that are noninterpretivist-"the former indicating
that judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to
enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written Constitution,
the latter the contrary view that courts should go beyond that set of references
and enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four comers of the
document" (p. 1). As Professor Ely rightly recognizes, each theory "racks
up rhetorical points by exposing the unacceptability of the only alternative"
(p. vii). In this war of destruction, Professor Ely suggests that both sides
are correct, for both theories are indeed unacceptable.
The interpretivists are Professor Ely's first target. However unfashionable in the academy,' interpretivism remains a kind of conventional wisdom;
the courts, for example, inevitably purport, except in the very last resort,
to fit their interventions into an interpretivist mold. Professor Ely suggests
two reasons for "the allure of interpretivism": 2 first, that doctrine "better
fits our usual conceptions of what law is and the way it works" (p. 3), and
second, its opposite faces "obvious difficulties . . . in trying to reconcile

itself with the underlying democratic theory of our government" (p. 4).
* Assistant Professor of Law, Columbia University. B.A. 1972, J.D. 1975, Columbia
University.
1. The beleaguered Raoul Berger is perhaps its sole prominent exponent. See, e.g., R.
Berger, Government by Judiciary (1977).
• 2. The phrase is the title of Ely's opening chapter, and derives from that of an earlier
article, in which he develops some of the reasoning of this portion of the book. See Ely,
Constitutional Interpretivism: Its Allure and Impossibility, 53 Ind. L.i. 399 (1978).
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But if interpretivism has its allure, it also has serious problems. Academic critics frequently argue the case against a narrow concentration on
the intentions of the framers of constitutional provisions by pointing to the
(to them) unaccceptable consequences of such a position: the framers
do not always seem to have intended results that most of us find of vital
importance. 3 Professor Ely's attack on interpretivism is especially devastating because it proceeds largely on the interpretivists' own premises. If
"incompatibility with democratic theory" is a problem for the noninterpretivist, it is not much less a problem for the most faithful strict constructionist (pp. 11-12), for the most frequently litigated constitutional provisions,
"to the extent that they ever represented the 'voice of the people[,]' represent the voice of people who have been dead for a century or two" (p. 11;
see also p. vii). If democracy requires that a majority of any group be
empowered to set policy, it is constitutionalism itself, not any particular
variant of it, that is the problem.
But Professor Ely's longer and even more compelling argument against
interpretivism is his demonstration that several constitutional provisions
plainly direct the importation into the Constitution of values not found in
the text or its legislative history. 4 The fourteenth amendment-most
particularly, the privileges or immunities clause-and the ninth amendment
constitute straightforward "delegation[s] to future constitutional decisionmakers to protect certain rights that the document neither lists, at least not
exhaustively, nor even in any specific way gives directions for finding"
(p. 28). 5 One can ignore these provisions-indeed, the dominant constitutional tradition has ignored them-but, as Ely persuasively demonstrates,
to do so one must be faithless to the idea of interpretivism.
But if the Constitution itself directs its interpreters to go beyond mere
interpretation, where are they to look for the "privileges or immunities" of
citizens, or the unenumerated rights "retained by the people"? Professor Ely
rejects "[t]he prevailing academic line . . . that the Supreme Court should
give content to the Constitution's open-ended provisions by identifying and
enforcing upon the political branches those values that are, by one formula
or another, truly important or fundamental" (p. 43). His argument here
is rich and complex in presentation, but its essence is simple: few would
find acceptable a theory of adjudication which held that "judges should use
their own values to give content to the Constitution's open texture" (p. 45),0
3. See, e.g., Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 703,
710-12 (1975).
4. Such importation is to be distinguished from the mere elaboration of concepts that
are specified in the text, even if the text and its history give little guidance about their precise contours, as for example the prohibition of "cruel and unusual punishments" in the
eighth amendment. The interpretation of such clauses poses some problems for the iriterpretivist, but does not leave the courts free to invent new anti-majoritarian rights (pp. 13-14).
5. The cited quotation refers to the privileges or immunites clause, but Ely takes essentially the same position with respect to the ninth amendment.
6. Indeed, Ely argues, following Linde, that "such a 'realist' theory of adjudication is
not a theory of adjudication at all, in that it does not tell us which values should be imposed" (p. 44).
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since such a theory would be profoundly undemocratic. But, as Ely wittily
though thoughtfully proceeds to demonstrate, all other potential sources of
fundamental values-Professor Ely considers in turn natural law, neutral
principles, reason, tradition, consensus, and predictions of the direction of
evolving values-when used by courts as bases for overturning legislative
judgments, lack sufficient agreed-upon content to amount to much more than
masks for precisely such imposition of the judges' policy preferences.
Having thus demolished both interpretivism and noninterpretivism, Ely
proceeds to erect his own theory of judicial review. Heavily influenced by
Justice Stone's Carolene Products footnote,7 Professor Ely suggests that in
interpreting the open-ended provisions of the Constitution courts should
not look for substantive values to elevate to a constitutional stature, but
rather should restrict themselves to pursuing "procedural" or "participational"
goals that open up and make effective the process of representative government, and ensure the fair representation of minority interests. In this way,
constitutional interpretation can be freed from the narrowness and selfcontradictions of "clause-bound" interpretivism, without opening the door
to the imposition of substantive outcomes by unelected officials. Judicial
review becomes an adjunct, rather than an adversary, of the democratic
process.
II
It is worth asking, I think, where these limitations on judicial review
come from. Professor Ely states three arguments in support of "a
participation-oriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review"
(p. 87). Close analysis of these arguments suggests to me, however, that
Professor Ely has not really escaped the potholes he has found the interpretivists and noninterpretivists driving into.
The first argument, presented at greatest length, is that the Constitution
"is overwhelmingly concerned, on the one hand, with procedural fairness
in the resolution of individual disputes (process writ small) and, on the
other, with what might capaciously be designated process writ large-with
ensuring broad participation in the processes and distributions of government" (p. 87). As Professor Ely recognizes, this is essentially an interpretivist argument,8 proceeding by the maxim ejusdem generis: the framers
must have meant the content of an open-ended catchall provision like
the ninth amendment to refer to additional rights somehow analogous to
those enumerated.
Surely Professor Ely is correct that the Constitution as a whole is
principally concerned with process and structure. That, of course, is to be
7. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). See also
L. Lusky, By What Right? (1975).
8. Pp. 87-88. Professor Ely correctly points out that the label is not particularly significant. The nature of the argument is worth noting, however, in order to decide what standards to apply in judging it.
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expected; it is, after all, a Constitution we are expounding, and constitutions
are primarily concerned with creating institutions-a business of structure
and process. But the ninth amendment, the principal open-ended provision
that Professor Ely wants to tame, is not a part of the original body of the
Constitution. Instead, it is part of a Bill of Rights that at least some of the
framers thought was not appropriately included in a constitutional document
precisely because it does attempt to insulate substantive values from majoritarian decision in exactly the way Professor Ely finds objectionable. 9 If we
are playing by interpretivist rules, the other "rights . . . retained by the

people" protected by the ninth amendment must be of the same genus as
those enumerated in the first eight amendments.
Recognizing this, Professor Ely proceeds to examine the Bill of Rights,
with a view to establishing that there, too, "participational" and procedural
concerns predominate. This portion of the book contains some of the most
brilliant law-professing I have seen in a while. Professor Ely is remarkably
adept at finding procedural values lurking behind apparently substantive
values, and for that matter at identifying substantive strands in what might
have seemed primarily procedural protections. The result of these intellectual
fireworks is a sense that even in the Bill of Rights, the enshrinement of
substantive value choices is rarer than we might have thought.
But this effect is created, I fear, as much by the smoke as by the light
generated by Ely's flares. A more pedestrian account suggests that the framers
of the Bill of Rights made no sharp distinction between the designation of
protected substantive entitlements and the protection of the democratic
political process, and at the very least had no aversion to including the former
in their document. The first amendment, for example, mingles in the same
sentence the protection of religious freedom (which Professor Ely concedes
was for the framers "an important substantive value they wanted to put
significantly beyond the reach of at least the federal legislature" (p. 94))
and the rights of assembly and petition (in Ely's terms, procedural values)with the freedoms of speech and press, which can be seen in either light,
poised neatly between.10 Is the second amendment a protection of a sub9. See, e.g., Federalist No. 84, quoted with approval at p. 93.
10. Professor Ely's assessment of the free-expression provisions of the first amendment
with respect to his dichotomy between participational and substantive values is uncharacteristically awkward. He states without qualification that these provisions "were centrally intended to help make our govermental processes work" (pp. 93-94). Nevertheless, his argument is apparently not based on the legislative history of the amendment, for he concedes
that "other functions" (presumably including a concern for the substantive protection of
individual autonomy, see Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral Theory
of the First Amendment, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 45 (1974)) "must have played a role" in their
inclusion, and that the amendment's protection cannot be limited to political speech. Nor
can the classification of freedom of expression unambiguously on the participational side
of the great divide rest on Ely's sneer at the "highly elitist" "view that free expression per
se, without regard to what it means to the process of government, is our preeminent right"
(p. 94). I agree that this is a view that comes more naturally to academics than to
others, but the point isn't that self-expression is preeminent among our rights, only that it
might well have appeared important enough to be enumerated, among such other controversial values as religion, gun-toting, and one's-home-as-one's-castle, as a substantive right.
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stantive right "to keep and bear arms" or a structural provision preserving
state militias? I'd like to agree with Professor Ely that it's the latter, but if
the object of the game is to figure out what sort of document the framers
thought the Bill of Rights was, I would agree more with his concession that
"the point is debatable" (p. 95). The third and fourth amendments seem
primarily concerned with substantive rights of privacy, personal security, and
property. Professor Ely concedes the third (after hinting at a partial
separation of powers rationale), but incredibly finds the fourth "another
harbinger of the Equal Protection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in treatment" (p. 97). Well, in a way, perhaps; let's just say,
with Professor Ely, that this perspective "obviously is only one of several"
(id.). To finish the catalogue more briefly, I remain unconvinced by
Professor Ely's ingenious arguments that the fifth amendment's prohibition
of the taking of property without just compensation is anything other than
a (limited) protection of the substantive value of private property, or that
the eighth is not in essence a prohibition of substantive abuses (pp. 97-98).
The rest of the fifth, sixth and seventh amendments, as Professor Ely agrees,
are primarily concerned with fair procedure, with some substantive components (pp. 95-96).
On my scorecard, then, we have three amendments, the third, fourth and
eighth, that are primarily concerned with protecting substantive rights; one,
the seventh, that is purely procedural, plus two, the fifth and sixth, that contain a mixture of mostly procedural requirements with a few protections of
substantive values; and two draws-the first, because its substantive and
participational values are so exactly balanced, and the second, because of the
difficulty of deciding what it was intended to do. But the point, of course,
is not to be decided by counting heads. What does emerge is that if we are
to determine the content of the ninth amendment by the rule of ejusdem
generis, we can only conclude that the framers of the Bill of Rights saw
values of both a substantive and a participational nature (as Professor Ely
uses the terms) as of the same kind, and that we therefore cannot limit ourselves, in giving content to that amendment, to rights of the latter sort."
So Professor Ely's conclusion that, for purposes of exploring "what sort of document our
forebears thought they were putting together," the free-expression clauses rate as participational is supported only by the "highly informative" linkage of speech and press with assembly and petition-a weak prop, given the equally close linkage of speech and press with
the admittedly substantive protection of religion.
11. Professor Ely might well reply that I have unfairly limited his argument. Although
at times he explicitly identifies this branch of his argument as "an exploration of what sort
of document our forebears thought they were putting together" (p. 94), at other times
his argument appears much less narrowly interpretivist. But at those points he appears
vulnerable to his own attacks on noninterpretivist reasoning. For example, Professor Ely
applies his ejusdem generis analysis not only to the document of which the principal text
to be explained is a part (the Bill of Rights), but to the entire Constitution, including subsequent amendments up to and including ERA, and draws support from the claim that of
those constitutional provisions he admits embody substantive policy choices, most have been
insignificant, disastrous, or repealed. I wouldn't say these approaches are unpersuasive, but
they appear infected with exactly the vices Professor Ely elsewhere sees as insuperable. The
crux of these arguments is not the light they shed on what the authors of the ninth amend-
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Professor Ely's analysis of the content of the Constitution contains not only
skillful worrying of particular provisions, but also a useful reminder of the
extent to which our constitutional scheme does rely on procedural strategies
to safeguard liberty. It does not, however, in the end provide a convincing
interpretivist demonstration that the protection of substantive values from
the majoritarian process is not also a significant aspect of that scheme and
a legitimate basis for judicial elucidation of open-ended constitutional provisions.
Professor Ely's second argument in favor of his proposed limitations
on judicial review is the most important, and constitutes the major message
of the book. The "representation-reinforcing orientation" he urges on the
courts, "unlike an approach geared to the judicial imposition of 'fundamental
values,'.., is not inconsistent with, but on the contrary is entirely supportive
of, the American system of representative democracy" (pp. 101-02). Of
course, Professor Ely is correct that the kind of review he suggests is less
intrusive into the representative political process than a theory that permits
the courts to constitutionalize substantive value choices, 12 and that the dominant constitutional tradition in the United States is democratic and majoritarian.13 I do have two problems with this argument, however.
The first is that Professor Ely seems to think that the question of an
institution's consistency with democratic principles can be answered yes or
no, rather than more or less. No one can question that the elected branches
of government are more responsible to popular majorities than unelected
judges. But both our formal political institutions and our actual structure
of power abound in significant checks on majoritarian power. These checks
are hardly as trivial as they seem to Professor Ely. The representational
nature of our democracy is not just a concession to the impracticality of
large-scale town-meetings (p. 4), but a significant moderation of majoritarian control that fosters the influence of political elites and activist minorities. The separation of powers between executive and legislature makes our
system considerably less responsive to popular majorities than a parliamenment meant, but rather what they say about the nature of our constitutional tradition.
Granted, this inquiry is not quite as elusive as the attempt to identify fundamental values in
our extraconstitutional tradition, but the problems are very similar. Perhaps the protection
of substantive values is not the "dominant theme of our constitutional document" (p. 101),
but all of Professor Ely's formidable interpretive skill can't make it go away altogether. In
that case, what warrant can there be for selecting one strand of a complex tradition and
reading it out of the document? I would have to conclude that "[tihere does not exist an
unambiguous American tradition on the question" whether protection of substantive values
does or doesn't belong in a constitution (pp. 62, 99).
Moreover, as Professor Ely has warned us to expect, the appeal to extraconstitutional
tradition can be selectively invoked: if the judicially-accomplished "repeal" of the second
amendment or the contracts clause is relevant in determining the genius of our constitutional
tradition (p. 100), why isn't the judicially accomplished creation of economic or "privacy"
rights? Aren't both equally parts of our constitutional heritage?
12. Professor Ely's theory by no means calls for a supine Supreme Court, however.
He finds essentially all of the work of the Warren Court, for example, consistent with his
principles (pp. 73-75).
13. "We have as a society from the beginning, and now almost instinctively, accepted

the notion that a representative democracy must be our form of government" (p. 5).
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tary system. Major powers are assigned to a Senate not elected according
to population,' 4 increasing the influence of certain regions. Constitutionalism, even with review far more narrowly constrained than Professor Ely
would permit, puts certain questions beyond the wishes of a simple majority.
Permitting judges to reject political choices they find inconsistent with their
views of the nation's basic values may be just another part of a system that
on the whole does not require instant effectuation of the will of today's
majority, but that rather commonly requires major decisions to be based on
broader, more lasting consensus, occasionally with formal or de facto veto
powers lodged in particular social or regional groups.
There isn't space here to debate the significance of these or other limits
on majoritarianism that are built into our political system, or the related
question of just how unresponsive to popular sentiments the courts really
are. 15 I wouldn't for a moment argue that Professor Ely is wrong in concluding that majoritarian democracy is at the core of our political institutions
(p. 7), and that the courts are further from that core than the elected
branches of government. What I would say is that the thesis that judges
should have a role in substantive policy choices is not so alien to the spirit
of American institutions as to be illegitimate.
My second problem with Professor Ely's argument concerns the type
of argument it is. Professor Ely is in effect arguing that substantive judicial
review is illegitimate because it is inconsistent with what he sees as the dominant theme in the American political tradition. But that argument is vulnerable to the same criticisms Professor Ely has made of attempts to find
substantive values in that tradition.' 6 The American political tradition is a
rich one, and contains many contradictory elements. As I have argued
above, without questioning that majoritarianism is a dominant element in that
tradition, other elements are present as well, many of which directly limit
the majoritarian tendency.
My point, in short, is this: Professor Ely complains that the noninterpretivist who would have judges give content to open-ended constitutional
provisions by deciding what political decisions are contrary to our traditions
is essentially deceiving herself-the judge will in the end be applying her
own values to thwart the popular will. But that is just what Mr. Justice Ely
himself is doing. Reading such provisions in light of his view of our traditions, he would override majoritarian decisions that conflict with his preferred portion of that tradition, that which favors broad political participation
and relatively few substantive constraints on majority choices.
Professor Ely's third argument in favor of "representation-reinforcing"
judicial review only makes this point clearer. I would agree with him that
14. Indeed, the power to block treaties is given to a minority of the Senate.
15. Still less is there space to debate the extent to which political institutions, elective
or not, are influenced or dominated by social or economic elites. Nor, for that matter, are
law professors particularly well equipped to debate that issue.
16. Pp. 60-63. See also note 11 supra.
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judges, as outsiders to the political system, are better able than legislators
to decide when legislators have perverted the process of popular representation. But this argument implies that a judge applying an open-textured constitutional provision should give it content by asking what role the courts
can most effectively play in a representative democracy. In that case, what
ultimately divides Professor Ely from the judge who would embark on the
admittedly personal and fallible search for basic values that the legislature
should not be allowed to tamper with is not a question of legitimacy but of
practical political philosophy. Professor Ely's reminder to judges that they
are not necessarily in closer harmony than elected officials with popular
values, or with what popular values would be if people would only stop to
think, is extremely important. But I am not convinced that the presence of
an institution composed of politically selected but tenured members that is
officially commissioned, in a way the political branches of government are
not, to compare political decisions with a rationalized account of the longerrange value commitments our political tradition has made is not on balance
a valuable addition to a system of representative democracy.
II
I have concentrated on Professor Ely's arguments for his "participationoriented, representation-reinforcing approach to judicial review" (p. 87)
because I think they reveal his failure to get beyond the dichotomy between
interpretivist and noninterpretivist approaches. His essentially interpretivist
argument that "the sort of document our forbears thought they were writing"
dictates that open-ended provisions of the Constitution should be read in
accordance with his scheme fails because if the intention of the authors is
to be our guide, at least one such provision, the ninth amendment, is embedded in that part of the Constitution that more than any other embodies
substantive value choices. On the other hand, his attempt to read those
provisions in light of what he sees as the genius of American democracy
suffers from precisely the weaknesses he identifies in other non-interpretivist
efforts to find other sorts of values in our political traditions: the tradition
is too rich and contradictory to support a confident assertion that one or
another of any complex set of values, including Professor Ely's participational
values as well as various substantive ones, is mandated or forbidden sufficiently plainly to justify overriding political decisions. In the end, Professor
Ely is reduced to arguing, just as he predicts the noninterpretivist would be,
that judges should adopt his approach because it's a good one-that is,
because it represents his own values and ought to represent theirs.' 7
17. The same problems exist for Professor Ely when he applies his approach to particular
constitutional problems. Even if we grant that judicial review should be "participation-oriented
[and] representation-reinforcing," this succeeds only in isolating what sorts of issues aro

appropriate for constitutional adjudication (or more precisely, what sorts of issues are not).

But when the time comes to apply that approach to, say, the problem of legislative delegation
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But the contradiction between Professor Ely's strictures on noninterpretivist thinking and his decided noninterpretivist practice hardly robs his
book of value. As between what Ely says and-what he does, I much prefer
what he does-which is very impressive indeed, and seems to me to represent
a most productive style of constitutional interpretation.
Having determined that certain constitutional provisions "cannot intelligibly be given content solely on the basis of their language and surrounding
legislative history, indeed that certain of them seem on their face to call for
an injection of content from some source beyond the provision" (p. 12),
Professor Ely proceeds according to the method developed by Ronald
Dworkin for his ideal judge Hercules: he attempts to look for those values in
a theory derived from "the constitutional scheme as a whole." 18 Professor
Ely suggests that his theory should be derived "from the general themes of
the entire constitutional document and not from some source entirely beyond
its four comers," (p. 12) but that turns out to be impractical. At numerous
points in his argument, Professor Ely resorts to extraconstitutional sources of
law, including judicial interpretation and state constitutional developments.' 9
In effect, Professor Ely is deriving his set of values from our entire constitutional tradition-attempting to create a scheme of judicial review premised
on the genius of American political institutions, as he understands it.
Now, Professor Ely is exactly right that this is an enterprise that will
be heavily influenced by the judge's own values. Whether we are looking
for substantive or participational values, or trying to decide whether one or
the other type is preferable, the complexity of the system ensures that some
elements will be inconsistent with any theory, and will have to be explained
away or disregarded as aberrations. What elements of the tradition seem
most important will be affected by the judge's views of what constitutional
theory is most wise and just (and indeed Professor Ely, like most judges and
scholars, winds up finding that the scheme inherent in our constitutional order
is the one he finds most attractive) .20 The fact that the sources of values in
(pp. 131-34), the question of how much delegation is consistent with the general participationalist principle that decision-makers should be politically responsible (which can be
deduced from the constitutional document) is wide open. Other than the judge's own
reasoned preferences and what can be gleaned from judicial and political tradition, I don't
see what sources of principle are available.
18. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 106 (1977). Compare id. with Ely at 12.
19. For example, Professor Ely minimizes the importance of the indirect election of
the President by noting the early evolution in the states toward popular selection of electors
(p. 6); relies on judicial "repeal" of the second amendment and the contracts clause to
limit their importance as counter-examples to his thesis that the Constitution does not protect
substantive entitlements (p. 100); and tries to reduce the significance of the religion clauses
on the same point by noting the types of cases that have in fact been brought in recent
years (id.).
20. As Professor Dworkin points out, the constitutional theory any judge will develop
would be more or less different from the theory that a different judge would develop,
because a constitutional theory requires judgments about complex issues of institutional fit, as well as judgments about political and moral philosophy . . . . So the
impact of [the judge's] own judgments will be pervasive, even though some of these
will be controversial. But they will not enter his calculations in such a way that different parts of the theory he constructs can be attributed to his independent convictions
rather than to the body of law that he must justify.
R. Dworkin, supra note 18, at 117-18.
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which the judge must search for her theory-tradition, the essence of the
constitutional document as a whole, reason, etc.-are incapable of totally
filtering out the judge's own perceptions of right bothers Professor Ely, because his preferred constitutional theory, in my view, pays too little heed to
the restraints our system puts on majoritarianism. Valuing these more
highly, I find a judicial role in enunciating fundamental substantive values
to give content to open-ended constitutional provisions consistent with the
Constitution, and not undesirable.
In any event, I would say that the difference between the kinds of antimajoritarian interventions Professor Ely would permit and those I would find
legitimate is a matter of degree as much as of quality. And in that respect
I find Professor Ely's contribution to constitutional theory enormously valuable. While I do not think that he has succeeded in elaborating a completely
new approach to constitutional interpretation, or in demonstrating that his
is the only legitimate theory of judicial review, his insistence on the importance of the democratic process, and his frequent reminders that the theories
of judicial review favored by many academics further the interests of the
social class to which they belong with suspicious regularity, 2' are useful correctives to the current conventional wisdom. And his analyses of many particular constitutional issues, especially in the areas of free expression and
equal protection, are remarkably perceptive. 22
Overall, then, though I have concentrated mostly on my disagreements
-with Professor Ely's approach, I would recommend Democracy and Distrust
as a thoughtful, well-written, 23 and provocative book that makes a significant
contribution to constitutional theory. I hope it is widely read.
21. Indeed, one of the most troubling aspects of judicial review in any form is that
the very mode of reasoned discourse on which it relies, and which constitutes its distinctive
contribution to the political process, is closely associated with what some would view as a
powerful segment of society. See A. Gouldner, The Future of Intellectuals and the Rise of
,the New Class (1980).
(Admittedly, Professor Gouldner sees this association more hopefully than I, but see G. Konrad & I. Szelenyi, The Intellectuals on the Road to Class
Power (1980).)
22. I do find Professor Ely's analysis of women's rights somewhat perplexing. Because
women in the past were formally blocked from access to the political process, he would have
the courts strike down as violations of equal protection any statute that dates from that
past era. But because women are free today to participate in politics, he would permit present
and future legislatures to reinstitute such laws, since they would then be the product of a
fair process, even if many of us would regard them as unfair in substance, since the latter
issue is not of constitutional importance (pp. 164-70). While I agree with Professor Ely
that in practice it is likely that most official gender discrimination would be eliminated by
this approach, this analysis seems to me to put too heavy an emphasis on formal access to
power, and too little on the need to reject stereotypes that, even if they were shared by a
majority of women, as a substantive matter unfairly restrict the freedom of those men and
women who do not share them. But that is just an example of an area in which I find
substantive review desirable, and I quite understand that Professor Ely does not. What
perplexes me is that Professor Ely apparently supports the Equal Rights Amendment (p. 99),
which I would have thought is clearly intended to prohibit even future legislatures from
adopting non-gender-neutral laws, with only the narrowest of exceptions. If the same
result should not be reached by interpretation of the equal protection clause, because it
is not a matter of fair procedure, then isn't the ERA an example of the attempt to "freeze
substantive values" that Professor Ely thinks "doles] not belong in a constitution" (p. 99)?
23. Professor Ely's style has been much and deservedly praised for its liveliness, humor,
and vividness. I would note only one reservation: at times his tone becomes a shade too
flip and sarcastic for my taste, suggesting an arrogance that his warm and graceful tributes
to Alexander Bickel, Earl Warren, and Hugo Black belie.

